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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
DON PUGH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

)

vs.
CUMON STRATTON and
RUBY ANDERSON,
Defendants and Appellants.

~

Case
No.
11102

I

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT AND NATURE OF CASE
This is an action brought by Plaintiff and Respondent
for recovery of cattl.e grown by him.
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
The lower Court found the issues for the Plaintiff and
Respondent.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff and Respondent seeks to have affirmed the
judgment of the trial Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In this statement of facts and throughout this brief the
Plaintiff and Respondent will be referred to as the Plaintiff,
and the Defendants and Appellants as the Defendants.
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Since the above entitled matter was submitted to the
District Court on stipulation, we are of the opinion that it
is essential to have the stipulated facts set forth in detail.
WhiJe there are no disputed facts, the brief of the Defendants appears to leave the impr,ession that a Bill of Sale for
the livestock in controversy was in the possession of Harold
Woodard, Tri-State Livestock Auction, or some other person who was a predecessor in interest to the Defendants.
This was not the case and neither Harold Woodard, the Tri.
State Livestock Auction Company, or anyone acting for
them has at any time had a Bill of Sale to the livestock involved.
The stipulated facts found by the Trial Court w,ere as
follows:
1. Plaintiff owned and raised 10 head of Hereford
heifers and 10 head of Hereford steers, which were branded
with Plaintiff's register.ed brand,PU - on the left ribs and
the earmark specifically shown in the Plaintiff's Complaint.
2. Plaintiff was the legal owner and had duly registered the brand and earmark with the Department of Agricultur,e of the State of Utah as required by the laws of the
State of Utah.
3. The Plaintiff delivered possession of the livestock
to one Harold J. Woodard on the 1st day of November, 1966
after negotiatiom; which took place in Kane County, Utah,
during which Mr. Pugh (Plaintiff) re0eived a sight draft
and incorporated Bill of Sale r,equiring payment of $1,648.86,
which was to be paid by or through the Bank of Southern
Utah, Cedar, City, Utah.
4. No Bill of Sale or other instrument conveying title
was delivered to Harold J. Woodard, Tri-State Livestock
Auction, or the Defendants (Appellants) herein.
5. The sight draft and attached Bill of Sale were presented to the Bank of Southern Utah, at Cedar City, Utah,
and was dishonored and r eturne<l to the Plaintiff. The sight
draft and attached Bill of Sale has been in possession of the
Plaintiff since the date of dishonor.
1
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6. Harold J. Woodard delivered said livestock to the
Tri-State Livestock Auction on or about the 3rd day of Nov,ember, 1966. The Defendant, Cumon Stratton, purchased
10 head of steers and 1 heifer owned by the Plaintiff and
branded and earmarked with the Plaintiff's brand and earmark, and the Defendant, Ruby Anderson, purchased 8 head
of heifers with Plaintiff's brand and earmark.
7. The 10 head of steers and 1 heifer purchased by
Cumon Stratton had a reasonable value of $966.30, and the
8 head of Hereford heifers purchased by Ruby Anderson
had a reasonable value of $606.72.

8.
9.
10. Neither the Defendants nor their predecessors in
title have received a Bill of Sale to said livestock in accordance with Section 4-13-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and
Plaintiff has at all times material in these proceedings retained ownership of said livestock and is entitLed to possession thereof.
11. The Defendants purchasing said livestock through
the Tri-State Livestock Company of St. George, Utah, have
receiv:ed from said auction separate Bills of Sale upon which
the auction company makes the express representation that
it makes no warranties or guarantees concerning said livestock and uses the following language:
"Our responsibility ceases when liv,estock leaves the
barn. Any statement or guarantee made in regards
to any livestock sold is the statement of the seller.
We act as ag,ents only."
12. The Plaintiff has committed no acts nor made no
omissions which would estop him from asserting title to said
livestock.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
TITLE TO THE CATTLE WAS NOT TRANSFERRED TO
DEFENDANTS OR THEIR PREDECESSORS IN INTER-
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EST OR CONSIGNED FOR SALE THROUGH A REGULAR LIVESTOCK AUCTION.
POINT II
THE DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS DID NOT
ACQUIRE TITLE TO SAID CATTLE BY PURCHASING
AT A LIVESTOCK AUCTION.
POINT III
THE COUNTY OF KANE WAS THE PROPER VENUE
FOR THE HEARING OF THE CA USE OF ACTION FOR
REPLEVIN.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
TITLE TO THE CATTLE WAS NOT TRANSFERRED TO DEFENDANTS OR THEIR PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST OR CONSIGNED FOR SALE
THROUGH A REGULAR LIVESTOCK AUCTION.
As has alr.eady been shown by the Statement of Facts,
the Def.endants have not at any time received a Bill of Sale
for the livestock in controversy. At the time the Plaintiff
was fraudulently induced to give poss.ession of the livestock
to one Harold Woodard, the Plaintiff did prepare a Bill of
Sale which he retained. He deposited the Bill of Sale with
his bank with instructions that it was not to be deJiv.ered
until payment in full was received.
Payment was never received and the Bill of Sale was
retained by the Plaintiff.
The Defendants have at no time received a Bill of
Sale to the livestock involved from the Plaintiff, but have
only received an instrument from the Tri-State Livestock
Auction Company, Inc. of St. George, Utah, which purports
to be a Bill of Sale and also uses the following language:
"Our respo11Clibilitv ceases when the livestock leaves
the barn. Any st'atrment or guarantee made in regards to any livestock sold is the statemene of the
seller. We act as agents only."
4

The Utah Livestock Brand Act appears to be the ,exclusive method for transferring title to livestock under the
circumstan0es involved in this matter. Section 4-13-17,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as follows:
"Bills of Sale - When proof of ownership required.
-Upon the sale, consignment, alienation or transfer
of title of any livestock, by any person in this state
the actual delivery of such animals shall be accom~
panied by a written bill of sale from the vendor or
the party s,elling to the party purchasing giving the
number, sex, brands, and marks of each animal, date
and place of purchase, signature and address of both
s,eller and purchaser; provided, that any person so
selling or transferring title to said livestock which
are branded and marked with any brand and mark
not the recorded brand and mark of person selling,
shall provide nroof of ownership from whom the
livestock was purchased and the length of time held
in his possession."
The foregoing statute is specific in its requirement and
appears to be clearly controlling. An attempt to adopt any
other procedure for th9 handling of livestock would cause
livestock growers to loose complete control of their livestock
and the branding act would be nullified.
There is no dispute that the marks and brands on said
cattle wer,e the marks and brands recorded in the name of
the Plaintiff. There was no evidence offer,ed to indicate
that the Plaintiff had in any way conducted himself in such
a manner that the Defendants would be mi,sJ,ed and might
in some manner estop Plaintiff from asserting title to the
livestock involved.
Because of the clear markings on the animals, the Defendants had notice of the ownership of said livestock by
the Plaintiff prior to their purchase from the Tri-State
Livestock Auction Company.
The State of Idaho has a livestock brand statute which
is similar to that of the State of Utah. In an interesting
case ' Radermacher
vs. Daniels et al, 133 P2d 713, it was held
~::::..:;;;:,.:..:::..::::.;::.::.;:::.......:...::..;~~~~~....;.
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that livestock sold by the Defendants, which were branded
with a brand duly recorded in the office of the Department
of Agriculture as the Plaintiff's brand, put the Defendants
on notice of the Plaintiff's ownership. The Idaho Supreme
Court held that the Defendants were charged w it h legal
notice of the Plai·ntiff's ownership and could not be innocent
purchasers for value.
The purpose and need for the Utah Livestock Brand
Act is similar to the purpose and need for the Real Estate
Recording Act. Section 57-3-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
provides that the recordation of any instrument in writing
effecting real estate with the county recorder in which the
:r:eal estate is located imparts notice to the public and also
provides:
" ... and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees, and
lien holders shall be deemed to purchase and take
with notice."
It is argued by the Defendants that the Utah Livestock
Brand Act dted above has been amended by the Uniform
Commercial Code. The Defendants suggest that Section
70A-2-401 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
governs this situation. It is interesting to note the I.egislative history of this particular section and particularly Sections 60-2-7 and 60-2-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which
were a part of the Utah Sales Act and which sections wiere
later incorporated into the Uniform Commercial Code.. The
Utah sales sections were first adopted in the year 1917.
While these provisions were part of the Utah law, in the
year of 1939, the Utah State Legislatul'le adopted the Utah
Livestock Brand Act. The legislature, aware of the 'existence of the sales act and its purpose, also amended the livestock brand act in 1933 and in 1951. The history of the
sales act and later Uniform Commercial Code clearly demonstrates that the legislature intended the Utah Livestock
Brand Act to be exclusive and controlling in matters dealing
with U.vestock. The Uniform Commercial Code became
effective on January 1, 1966 and merely incorporated
the rules which were already in effect in this particular
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area under the original Utah S::tles Act of 1917. It
is also enlightening to note that a s.ection of the Utah
Livestock Brand Act was revi€wed by the last legislature
in the year of 1967 and was amended (See Session Laws of
Utah, 1967, Chapter 6, Section 1, whkh amended Section 413-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.) If the legislature had
intended Section 70A-2-401 (2), Utah Code Annotated 1953
as amended to pre-empt the livestock field as contended b;
Defendants, it would have been a simple matter for the legislature to do so.
POINT II
THE DEFENDANTS AN D APPELLANTS DID
NOT ACQUIRE TITLE TO SAID CATTLE BY
PURCHASING AT A LIVESTOCK AUCTION.
There is no 1evi<lence to show that the Plaintiff at any
time contemplated turning his livestock to a livestock auction company. Harold Woodard, the person who took possession of the livestock, was also known to place livestock
with other feeders and to purchas:e directly for livestock
meat packing companies. The Defendants, in their argument, are attempting to assume facts not before the Court
and argue a theory of estoppel.
The Defondants have contended that the Plaintiff entrusted his livestock to a third party who in turn delivered
them to a livestock auction company for sale. It is contended that Section 70A-2-403 of the Uniform Commerdal Code
applies and further that the purchasers in the ordinary
course of business could acquire good title. The section of
the Uniform Commercial Code does not apply.
The Utah Livestock Brand Anti-Th€ft Act, Section 413-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, specifically contemplates
the type of situation in which the parties to this action are
involved with the following language:
"Provided, that any person so selling or transferring
title to said livestock which ar,e branded and marked
with any brand and mark not the recorded brand and
mark of the person selling, shall provide proof of
ownership from whom the livestock was purchased
and the length of time held in his possession."
7

The Utah Legislature has provided that w h e n the
brands and marks are clearly apparent on the animal being
purchased, the markings give notice of ownership to all persons. TheJ:1efor.e, the purchaser is obligated to establish
some chain of title from the registered owner of said animal
before the buyer can be protected in his purchase.
The Defondants here would clearly have a claim against
the Tri-State Livestock Auction Company for thei-r breach
of duty but would not have acquired a ownership interest
in the livestock.
The Utah Case of Heaston vs. Martinez, 282 P2d 833,
as also cited as being applicable and controlling, does not
appear to apply. The case involves a wholesale automobile
dealer in Denver, Colorado who sold two automobHes to a
used car dealer in Murray, Utah. The automobiles
were not titled in the State of Utah, but were titled
in the State of Colorado. Therefor.e, a purchaser had
no method of checking title within this State. Also,
the seller placed the vehicles with a retail dealer who held
them in his inventory for saie. Under these circumstances,
the buy,er c o u 1 d not have had statutory or constructive
notice of the owner's interest in said vehicles and it also
appears that there were other factors which would .estop
the owner from raising the question.
POINT III
THE COUNTY OF KAN E WAS THE PROPER
VENUE FOR THE HEARING OF THE CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR REPLEVIN.
The action upon w h i ch the Plaintiff's Complaint is
founded arose in Kane County. The livestock were taken
from the Plaintiff in Kane County by false representations
and converted to the use of the Def.endants' predecessors in
interest. Since the action for conversion of livestock was
brought by Plaintiff, he had the following alternatives:
(1) To bring an action for the return of the livestock,
or
(2) To sue the Defendants for money judgment.
8

Section 78-13-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, concerning the place of trial, is as follows:
"All other actions. - In all other cases the action
must be tried in the county in which the cause of
action arises, or in the county in which any defendant resides at the commencement of the
action; ... ".
The action of Hale vs. Barker, 70 Utah 284, 259 Pac.
928, has interpreted the section to allow the Plaintiff to
elect the place of trial in a conversion case and uses the following languag.e:
"Plaintiff has the right of election under this Section to institute the action for conversion of goods
either in the county where the cause of action arose
or in the county where the defendant r.esides, the
plaintiff electing the county where the cause of action arose, the defondant has no right . . . . . . to
change of v.enue, ...... ".
The case of Schramm-Johnson Drugs vs. Cox, 79 Utah
276, 9 P2d 399, states that for the purpos.e of venue,
and venue only, the complaint will be regarded rather liberally in favor of the pleader, in determining whether it states
a cause of action in torte or in contract.
The two Utah cases cited Leave no doubt that the action
for conversion of livestock arising in K an e County was
properly tried where the liv•estock were taken.
Under these circumstances, the Court did not err in
denying Defendants' Motion for Change of Venue.
CONCLUSION
We ~espectfully submit the judgment of the trial Court
~hould be affirmed on appeal.
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN
By TEX R. OLSEN
Attorney for Respondent
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